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ABSTRACT 
 
 
  We study put option sales undertaken by corporations during their repurchase 
programs.  Put sales’ main theoretical motivation is market timing, providing an excellent 
framework for studying whether security issues reflect managers’ ability to identify 
mispricing.  Our evidence is that these bets reflect timing ability, and are not simply a 
result of overconfidence.  In the 100 days following put option issues, there is roughly a 
5% abnormal stock price return, and much of the abnormal return follows the first 
earnings release date after the put sale.  Longer term effects are generally not detected.  
Put sales also appear to reflect successful bets on the direction of stock price volatility.  
  21  Introduction 
This paper examines corporate put option sales undertaken by U.S. corporations 
during their share repurchase programs in the 1991-2004 period. Using a comprehensive, 
hand-collected dataset, we study the firms and the put sale transactions. Our contribution 
is two-fold. First, the sale of puts on a firm’s own stock is an interesting financial 
innovation in its own right, and our study is the only large-scale empirical analysis. 
Second and more importantly, put option sales provide an excellent setting to study 
managers’ market timing ability. Put option sales are gambles that the firm’s stock price 
will rise, and market timing is the most plausible rationale for the transaction.  
Our study advances an extensive literature on the relation between corporate 
transactions, inside information, and market timing (see Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli, 2006 
and Baker, Ruback, Wurgler, 2006 for surveys). Managers can alter investment, 
financing, and other corporate decisions when they believe their firms’ securities are 
mispriced. Despite the extent of the literature, the importance of market timing 
explanations for corporate behavior is hotly debated and still unresolved. Most of the 
evidence in support of market timing comes from long-horizon event studies that 
document abnormal returns following equity issues and repurchases. But since there are 
many motives for these transactions other than market timing, it is hard to distinguish 
among alternative explanations. Moreover, measuring abnormal returns over long 
horizons is problematic, especially given that firm risk may change around equity issues 
because of contemporaneous changes in asset structures.  
We provide evidence on the key assumptions behind the market timing story in a new 
setting that avoids some of the challenges faced by prior literature. In particular, we test 
whether managers can identify mispricing in their own securities, and whether they are 
willing to exploit it by selling or buying securities using the corporate account. The put 
option sale setting provides an experimental design with many useful features. First, 
management’s desire to exploit perceived mispricing represents the most plausible 
rationale for put sales. The put sales are not an efficient way to raise capital. There are no 
tax advantages associated with selling puts, and put sales have no effects on reported 
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information. Second, unlike debt or equity issues, put sales have no simultaneous effect 
on investment activity. Thus, any abnormal stock returns associated with these 
transactions cannot be attributed to contamination from investment effects.  
Third, the put sale setting reduces errors of inference because the typical put option 
issued has a maturity of only 6 months. Given the short maturities, our timing tests can 
focus on the detection of short-horizon effects. This avoids the well-known difficulties 
associated with long-horizon return studies (see Fama, 1998, and Kothari and Warner, 
2006 for overviews). Fourth, the fact that firms issuing these options are choosing short 
maturities is itself of interest. It suggests that what management thinks it knows about 
mispricing is short-term in nature. Finally, put option issues represent bets not only on the 
stock price, but on volatility. If management has private information that volatility will be 
lower than what the market expects, then put sales will be profitable. We examine 
volatility patterns to test whether timing ability and management’s information extends to 
higher order moments of the stock return distribution.  
We find strong evidence that managers have the ability to identify mispricing in their 
own securities and use the corporate account to exploit it. In the 100 trading days 
following put option issues, there is roughly a 5% abnormal stock return. The results are 
robust to specification of the abnormal return model. Much of the abnormal return 
follows the first earnings release date after the put sale, and there is no price jump at the 
release date. Thus, managers’ private information is apparently not limited to one-quarter 
ahead earnings. The timing of abnormal returns is consistent with semi-strong form 
efficiency, however. Put sales are generally not announced when they occur or when 
earnings are released, and the market is unlikely to learn about the transaction before the 
release of the next quarterly report. Longer term stock price effects are generally not 
detected.  
The evidence also indicates that managers’ timing ability extends to volatility. 
Volatility declines after a firm’s initial put sale and increases after a put sale program 
terminates, suggesting that put sale programs coincide with periods of unusually low 
stock return volatility. Little managerial sophistication is required for such timing to be 
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likelihood of adverse announcements to be lower than outsiders do.  
The 137 put sellers in our sample are typically large and widely-followed, including 
firms such as Bank of America, Boeing, IBM, MacDonald’s, Microsoft, and Proctor and 
Gamble. The majority of issuers are in the S&P 500 and have high equity valuations 
compared to the overall market. Documenting successful bets on rising stock prices by a 
group of large growth firms is new to the market timing literature. In marked contrast, the 
literature on market timing with share repurchases finds positive excess returns 
predominantly for small, neglected firms with low valuations (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, 
and Vermaelen (1995), Peyer and Vermaelen (2005)).  
The result that put option sales reflect timing ability shifts our priors and increases 
our confidence in the potential importance of timing explanations for a broader cross-
section of firms and a wider range of transactions. Since there are many motives for 
corporate security issues other than market timing, the prior literature has struggled to 
distinguish among alternative explanations. Survey evidence shows that CFOs feel that 
they can time the market (Graham and Harvey, 2001), but this may simply reflect 
managers’ overconfidence in their ability to predict returns. Recent studies of insider 
trading raise doubts about whether managers of large firms have significant market 
timing ability (see Lakonishok and Lee, 2001, Jenter, 2005). Many papers examine the 
implications of managerial overconfidence, and recent empirical work suggests that there 
is an association between managerial overconfidence and aggressive corporate policies 
(Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey, 2006). Put sales do represent an aggressive bet, but 
our results show that managers use valid inside information in making that bet. This is 
not a test for managerial overconfidence, but it shows that overconfidence is not the only 
driver behind managers’ attempts to time security sales. 
Put option sales are generally private transactions with major investment banks or 
brokerages as counterparties. Our data do not allow us to explore investment banks’ 
motives to engage in these transactions, to determine how the trading profits were split, 
or which party initiated the deals. Anecdotal evidence indicates that put sales were 
proposed by the investment banks to the issuing firms (Investment Dealers’ Digest, 
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we do not expect that investment banks lost money trading against better informed 
issuers. Instead, anecdotal evidence suggests that the banks hedged their put positions by 
buying shares or exchange-traded options, and potentially shared the trading profits with 
the issuers (Atansov, Gyoshev, Szewczyk, and Tsetsekos (2004) formalize this 
argument).  
We take no stance as to whether our sample firms should have been selling put 
options on their own stock. Put sellers expose themselves to significant market risk, and 
many of them lost significant amounts in the 2000-2001 market downturn. There likely 
are cheaper and less risky ways to take a bet on a rising stock price, for example through 
a simple share repurchase. We cannot rule out that the put sales may be the result of an 
agency problem in which corporate treasury departments undertake transactions which 
are not in the overall interest of the firms. Our message is instead simply that the 
transactions are evidence of the issuers’ market timing ability. In fact, the agency 
interpretation would make the returns subsequent to put sales even more impressive, 
suggesting that treasury departments by themselves are able to generate annualized 
excess returns on the order of 10 percent. 
Section 2 gives background and discusses institutional features of put option issues, 
as well as the paper’s testable propositions. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 
discusses the stock return performance, operating performance, and volatility patterns 
around put option issues. Section 5 concludes. 
2  Background 
2.1   Institutional Features 
Put option programs are a financial innovation characterized by a dramatic rise, and 
an equally dramatic fall. A 1991 SEC ruling allows firms with repurchase programs to 
issue puts in their own stock. The ruling, in the form of a “no action” letter, states that the 
SEC will take no enforcement action against put issuers for manipulation of stock prices 
  6under the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.
1  Few specific restrictions apply to the put 
issues, but they must be out of the money at issue. Put option sales must be reported in 
the subsequent quarterly or annual report. 
The use of put options in conjunction with share repurchase programs surged in the 
1990s. Although the impetus for the 1991 ruling came from the CBOE, the put sales were 
generally structured as privately negotiated transactions. Announced by neither the 
issuers nor the counterparties, the transactions were nevertheless highly touted in the 
financial press.
2 Advantages cited include the general profitability, the tax-free 
proceeds
3, and the minimal disclosure requirements. The counterparty was typically an 
investment bank, who hedged the purchase by buying shares. Players in this market 
included Salomon Brothers and Morgan Stanley.
4 We do not know how many firms were 
approached by banks with offers to purchase puts, presumably such offers may have been 
extended to all large firms with share repurchase programs. What our data allows us to 
observe is whether the firms that accepted the offers based their decision on inside 
information and successfully timed their stock price.  
Since 2002, however, transactions have largely dried up. Many issuing firms lost 
money in the bursting of the Internet bubble, with Microsoft taking a reported loss of 1.3 
billion (McDonald, 2004). In addition, FAS No. 150 in 2003 likely had a damaging effect 
(see Bear Stearns, 2006). It changed the balance sheet classification of all sold put 
options from equity to liability. It also increased the transparency of put option sales and 
required that changes in fair value of put options had to be recorded through earnings.
5 
Any puts outstanding after the rule change would directly transmit stock price volatility 
into earnings volatility, likely making put sales much less attractive to firms. 
                                                 
1 For further details of the history, see Posell and Eades (1992a, b). Regulatory issues are also discussed in 
CBOE Investor Series Paper #2 “Corporate Stock Repurchase Programs and Listed Options” (2001).  
2 For example, the Business Week headline on February 23, 1998 stated that “Hedging techniques are 
earning millions in tax free income for savvy companies”. 
3 Sale proceeds are tax free under Section 1032 of the Internal Revenue Code, and do not increase 
accounting earnings.  
4 Morgan purchased the software which had been developed in-house by IBM, an early issuer, in 
conjunction with its own put option sales. 
5 Under Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) issue 88-9, put warrants were recorded at fair value in 
permanent equity. EITF issue 00-19 during our sample period also appears to have increased disclosure 
requirements.  
  72.2  Firms’ Motivation   
While there is a practitioner and academic literature on put option sales, there is a big 
gap in our knowledge. The literature is a mix of description, theory, and small sample or 
case analyses.
6  Because most firms do not publicize their use of such contracts, the 
relevant data are difficult to obtain. To fill this gap, we assemble a comprehensive sample 
of put option issuers, based on largely hand-collected data. We document the features of 
put option sales, and provide evidence on firms’ motivation.  
We focus on whether managers appear to have private information. This explanation 
pervades the put option sale literature. Other explanations are generally dismissed and 
have attracted less attention. Angel, Gastineau, and Weber (1997, p. 111) argue that the 
main rationale for using puts “is surprisingly simple: the underlying common stock is 
cheap”; in addition, these authors argue that puts are undervalued if management has 
private information that future volatility is lower than put buyers expect. Gibson, Povel, 
and Singh (2006) also presume that firms issuing put warrants have private information. 
In their model, put sales signal the firm’s prospects (see also Gyoshev, 2001 for a similar 
argument). McDonald (2004) and Atanasov et al. (2004) question the signaling motive 
because most firms do not announce put option sales. Grullon and Ikenberry (2000, p.51) 
list managers’ market timing abilities as a reason for the transactions, but they recognize 
that it is a strong assumption. At the same time, they are hard-pressed to find any other 
reason why put options are sold. They argue that there are potential costs: selling the 
options increases exposure to bad news and reduces flexibility because it precommits the 
firm to buy shares.  
Practitioners sometimes refer to put option sales as a hedge for an ongoing share 
repurchase program. This seems incorrect, except in the sense that the option premium 
reduces the cash required to repurchase shares. Since the return to the put selling firm is 
positively correlated with the return on the firm’s shares, firm risk is increased, not 
reduced, by a put option sale. Calling put sales a hedge is consistent with the recent 
literature on corporate hedging, which suggests that some activities labeled hedging are 
actually attempts to exploit information and make directional bets (see Baker, Ruback, 
                                                 
6 A Darden School case and teaching note provides an analysis of IBM’s 1992 put sales. (Posell and Eades, 
1992a, b); the empirical analysis in McDonald (2004) focuses mainly on Dell and Microsoft.  
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by the CFO of Microsoft, one of the most aggressive put sellers in our sample, in which 
he reported that “the vast majority of (hedging) programs are straight hedges…I expect 
they will continue to make money” (CFO Magazine, October 1999).  
A number of explanations for put option issues are analyzed by McDonald (2004). 
These include regulation, off-balance sheet treatment, and private information. He 
generally dismisses all explanations he considers, concluding that “there is no one single 
obvious and compelling explanation for put sales”. He is skeptical about private 
information explanations on theoretical grounds, and raises interesting questions about 
how firms could capture the gains. For example, since put sale transactions are not 
anonymous, one would expect that in an efficient market, the nature of the information 
would be incorporated into the put sale proceeds.
7  This point is addressed, however, in 
the theoretical model of Atanasov et al. (2004). In their analysis, investment bankers lose 
money on the options they purchase, but in equilibrium their relationship with the issuing 
firm allows them to make money by going long in the undervalued shares. Consistent 
with this, for a sample of 17 firms, they show that there is abnormal positive stock price 
performance following initial put sales. Gyoshev (2001) finds similar evidence for a 
sample of 38 initial sales. 
We treat the hypothesis that put sales are made because managers have private 
information as the paper’s central economic question. While the literature offers little 
insight into other reasons that put option sales could create value, an interesting 
alternative hypothesis is that put sales are simply mistakes made by overconfident 
managers. This kind of alternative hypothesis is implicit in our tests. Further, we have 
data on each firms’ transactions. As discussed later, this allows us to better examine both 
cross-sectional and time-series differences in abnormal returns subsequent to put option 
sales, and whether the transactions reflect private information, or just luck. 
                                                 
7 In addition, he argues that the put sales are inefficient because they are tax-disadvantageous relative to an 
equivalent position which goes long in shares and borrows.  
  93  Data collection and descriptive statistics 
We identify firms that sold put options on their own stock between 1991 and 2004 by 
searching annual and quarterly reports available on the Lexis-Nexis, Factiva, and Edgar 
databases. We eliminate any put issues which are sold in conjunction with other equity or 
debt securities by the same firm, and retain only stand-alone put sales. We match the put 
sellers with data on firm characteristics from Compustat and data on stock returns from 
CRSP. The final, comprehensive sample contains 137 firms and 796 distinct put issues. 
Fig. 1 shows that the put sales start in 1991 (with two issues by Intel) and increase in 
number throughout the 1990s. Put issues peak at 122 sales by 52 firms in 2000 before 
declining to 48 issues in 2002 and finally dropping to just two issues in 2004.  
3.1  Firm characteristics 
Table 1 reports characteristics of the put selling firms, and presents the same 
characteristics for all Compustat firms and for firms with ongoing share repurchase 
programs. The latter comparison is relevant since put sale programs are framed and 
announced as part of share repurchase programs, and it is interesting to see whether put 
sellers differ from other repurchasing firms. We define a share repurchase program as 
ongoing in a fiscal quarter when a firm repurchases shares worth at least 0.5% of its 
prior-quarter book assets. 
Table 1 shows that, on average, put issuers are larger than Compustat firms or firms 
with standard share repurchase programs. For example, the average book value of assets 
is $10.0 billion for put issuers, compared to $2.3 billion for both Compustat firms and 
repurchasing firms. Put sellers have average sales of $6.1 billion, compared to $1.2 
billion for Compustat firms and $1.8 billion for repurchasers. Their large size is reflected 
in the fact that 75 out of 137 put sellers are in the S&P500 in some or all of the years in 
which they sell puts.  
Put issuers are more profitable than other Compustat firms or repurchasers, with 
average ROA of 9% compared to -4% and 3%, respectively. They also have higher 
market valuations relative to book values: Put sellers have an average book-to-market 
ratio of 0.38, compared to 0.74 for Compustat firms and 0.63 for share repurchasers. All 
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valuations, and they outperform firms with standard share repurchase programs on all 
these dimensions. 
Table 2 shows that the sample firms are scattered across 33 two-digit SIC industry 
groups, with no industry dominating the sample. The three industries represented most 
strongly are “Chemicals and allied products”, “Industrial and commercial machinery and 
computer equipment”, and “Electronic and other electrical equipment and components, 
except computer”. The last column in Table 2 shows that these are also some of the 
largest industry groups on Compustat during the sample period. 
3.2  Put characteristics 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the put options issued by the sample firms. 
Typically, put sellers make no pre- or post-sale announcements of specific put sale 
transactions, and all our data are collected from subsequent financial statements. The 
quality of the reported information varies greatly across firms and is sometimes not 
highly detailed. For this reason the summary statistics are based on fewer observations 
than the total number of 796 put sales. The purchaser of the options is typically described 
as a financial investor or an investment bank, and the identity is disclosed in only a small 
number of cases. None of the puts appears to have been issued on a public exchange. The 
options are described as European whenever that information is provided, which is the 
case for only a minority of the sales. Some of the puts have non-standard features, such as 
allowing the issuer to settle the options before expiration, but the information on these 
features is again incomplete.  
Panel A of Table 2 reports statistics on individual put sale transactions. The exact 
date at which the put sale occurs is usually not reported, and we know the month or 
quarter (or occasionally an even longer time period) during which the sale takes place, 
with most sales reported as quarterly aggregates. This implies that the sales may reflect a 
single put issue if there was only one sale during the quarter, or they may be the 
aggregate of multiple issues that are reported together.  
  11The average sale transaction creates put options on 4.9 million shares, corresponding 
to 0.88% of shares outstanding. The puts have an average face value, defined as the 
number of puts times the average strike price, of $67.6 million, and the issuing firm 
collects an average premium of $10.5 million per sale. The size distribution of the put 
sales is right-skewed, with the largest face value of a single sale equal to $2.6 billion and 
the largest premium collected equal to $402 million.  
The vast majority of the puts are sold out of the money, with an average ratio of strike 
price to stock price during the put sale period of 0.95.
8 The median put sale has a 
maturity of six months, with a mean of 211 calendar days. Information on final put 
outcomes is provided for 447 of the 796 put sales, and, for this sub-sample, 36% of the 
put issues are exercised and 64% expire out of the money. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports summary information on the overall put sale programs. 
The average program consists of 5.8 put sales that occur over a period of 2.1 years. If we 
restrict the sample to the 103 firms that allow us to pinpoint each sale to (at most) a 
quarter, we find that the majority of programs are concentrated in only a few quarters: 29 
firms issue puts in a single quarter, 21 in two quarters, 11 firms in three quarters, and 5 
firms in four quarters. Only 12 firms issue puts in ten or more quarters. The average put 
issuer in the full sample sells options on 21 million shares or 4.2% of shares outstanding 
in total, and receives proceeds of $53.4 million. The total face value, that is the total 
value put at risk through the put sales, has a mean of $223.4 million. The highest 
proceeds collected by a single firm are $2.1 billion by Microsoft, and the highest face 
value is $7.7 billion by Intel. 
4  Can managers time the market with put option sales? 
We argue in Section 2 that market timing is the most plausible explanation for put 
option sales, and in this section, we test whether managers can time the market 
successfully.  
                                                 
8 In a small number of cases it is certain that puts are issued in the money because the strike price exceeds 
the stock price on all days of the put sale period. The 1991 SEC “no action” letter permits only the sale of 
out of the money puts, but explicitly deals only with exchange traded options. The over-the-counter options 
analyzed here are issued in a regulatory gray area, and some firms apparently did not feel bound by the 
restrictions in the “no action” letter. 
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Our first tests focus on detecting abnormal stock returns after put option sales. As 
explained in Section 3, we typically do not know the precise date at which the puts are 
sold. In most cases, we only know a time interval during which the sale occurs, usually a 
fiscal quarter, a calendar month, or sometimes multiple fiscal quarters. We call this time 
interval a “sale period” and we define an “event” as the last day of the sale period. If 
more than one put transaction occurs within the same sale period, we treat these 
transactions as one event in the subsequent analysis. In the following, we use the terms 
event and put sale interchangeably. 
4.1.1  Basic findings 
Fig. 2 shows average cumulative abnormal returns starting from trading day -100 to 
day 150 after the event. We have 651 events with abnormal returns available on day -100. 
To compute daily abnormal returns for each stock, we subtract the daily return on a 
benchmark portfolio from the corresponding stock return. In Fig. 2, we use as 
benchmarks the 49 industry portfolios and the 100 size and book-to-market portfolios 
from Ken French’s website at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/ 
(see also Fama and French, 1993 and 1997). The cumulative return from day –100 to t is 
then the sum of the daily abnormal returns during that period.  
Fig. 2 is striking. The average cumulative abnormal return is close to zero during the 
100 trading days leading up to the put sale, but increases immediately thereafter. For 
example, the mean industry-adjusted return is –0.55% on day 0, it increases to 1.87% 
during the first 50 trading days after the sale, and reaches 3.75% by day 100. The 
cumulative return appears flat during the following 50 days.  
These findings suggest that managers are able to use private information to time put 
option sales. Moreover, managers’ private information is relatively short lived: it affects 
returns shortly after the event and seems to be incorporated into prices within the 
following 100 trading days. This is much shorter than the long-run under- or 
overperformance associated with other corporate events, such as stock issues or 
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9 Interestingly, returns are zero or negative during the last fiscal quarter 
before the event, even though in most cases the actual put sales occur during that quarter. 
As we show in Section 4.2, however, most of the post-sale abnormal returns are realized 
within a short window around the first post-sale earnings announcement, which is 
consistent with the return pattern in Fig.1.  
In Table 4, we test whether the abnormal post-sale returns are statistically significant. 
We divide the event horizon into six 50-day intervals: from trading day -100 to -50, from 
trading day -50 to 0, etc., and report average cumulative returns and t-statistics for each 
of the 50-day intervals. If a given interval (e.g. -50 to 0) overlaps for different events of 
the same firm, we keep only the earlier event. The table confirms the findings in Fig. 2. 
Benchmark adjusted returns are positive and statistically significant for the first two 
intervals following the put sale. For example, the size and book-to-market adjusted return 
is 2.78% for the first 50 days after the put sale (t-statistic, 3.74), and it is 1.88% for the 
subsequent 50 days (t-statistic, 2.44). Benchmark adjusted returns are negative and not 
significant for the two time intervals before the put sale.  
The t-statistics in Table 4 could be overstated because event horizons overlap for 
some firms. To address this issue, we use the rolling portfolio approach suggested by 
Fama (1998). Specifically, for each day in the sample period, we construct a backward-
looking portfolio consisting of firms that have an event during the past 70 calendar days 
(we also look at the 140-day horizon; we choose the calendar-time horizons to match the 
horizons in Table 4). We then regress the portfolio excess returns on the excess returns on 
the market portfolio and the Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market factors, 
and test whether the regression intercepts (alphas) are different from zero. Intuitively, this 
method collapses the overlapping stock returns for a given day into one portfolio return, 
so that the standard errors are adjusted for cross-correlation. The tests confirm the results 
in Table 4. The daily alpha obtained using the 70-day equal weighted portfolio is 0.07% 
(t-statistic, 3.32), and it is 0.05% (t-statistic, 2.93) for the 140-day equal weighted 
portfolio. The results for the value weighted portfolios are somewhat stronger with an 
                                                 
9 See, for example, the survey articles by Fama (1998), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), Eckbo, Masulis, and 
Norli (2006), and Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2006).  
  14alpha of 0.09% (t-statistic, 3.33) for the 70-day portfolio, and an alpha of 0.08% (t-
statistic, 3.57) for the 140-day portfolio. 
4.1.2  The put sale vs. the repurchase announcement effect 
Put issuers typically have ongoing share repurchase programs, and several studies 
document positive abnormal returns following the announcements of repurchase 
programs (e.g., Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), Peyer and Vermaelen 
(2005)). Casual comparison suggests that the put sale effect is distinct from the 
repurchase announcement effect. First, comparing the size and book-to-market adjusted 
results in Table 4 to those in Peyer and Vermaelen, the repurchase announcement effect 
persists much longer (48 months compared to 100 trading days for put sales), but it is 
weaker at shorter horizons (after five months, it is only 1.89%, compared to 4.66% for 
the 100 trading days after put sales). Second, Peyer and Vermaelen report that the 
repurchase announcement effect is stronger for small high book-to-market firms, while 
the put sellers are typically large and have low book-to-market ratios. In fact, Peyer and 
Vermaelen find no abnormal returns at the five months horizon for either the top size 
quintile or the bottom book-to-market quintile formed from all Compustat firms. 
To compare the two effects more directly, we re-run the results in Table 4 using size 
and book-to-market portfolio benchmarks formed from a broad sample of repurchasing 
firms. To match the put issuer sample as closely as possible, we define the “repurchaser 
sample” based on completed repurchase transactions rather than just repurchase 
announcements. Specifically, we define a firm-quarter as a “repurchase quarter” if the 
firm repurchases shares worth at least 0.5% of prior-quarter book assets. We then form 
the repurchaser sample consisting of all firms with at least one repurchase quarter. Each 
firm enters the sample on the first day after its first repurchase quarter and exits the 
sample two years after its last repurchase quarter. (We choose two years to match the 
abnormal return horizon documented for repurchasing firms.)
10 Finally, we form 25 size 
and book-to-market portfolios from the repurchaser sample, again using breakpoints from 
                                                 
10 If a firm has a gap larger than two years between two repurchase quarters, the firm drops from the sample 
after the initial two-year gap and re-enters the sample after the subsequent repurchase quarter. 
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portfolios), and we re-run the tests in Table 4.  
We find that the put sale effect remains high after controlling for repurchases. For 
example, the size and book-to-market adjusted returns are 2.61% for the first 50 days 
after the put sale (t-statistic, 3.49), and they are 1.84% for the subsequent 50 days (t-
statistic, 2.48). For comparison, when the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios are 
formed using all Compustat firms rather than just the repurchasing firms, the abnormal 
returns are 3.12% for the first 50 days (t-statistic, 4.12) and 2.15% for the subsequent 50 
days (t-statistic, 2.83). Given that Ikenberry (1995) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) find 
little evidence of abnormal returns after repurchase announcements for large, low book-
to-market firms, i.e. firms comparable to our sample of put issuers, it is not surprising 
that controlling for stock repurchases has little impact on our results.  
4.1.3  Initiations and terminations of put option programs 
Finally, we look in more detail at the first and the last sale undertaken by each firm. 
The first sale is close to the decision to initiate the put sale program, so first sales may be 
better predictors of subsequent returns than the follow-up sales. Similarly, the last sale is 
followed by the decision to terminate the program, which may be driven by negative 
information, suggesting zero or even negative subsequent returns. Unfortunately, limiting 
the analysis to the first or last sales substantially reduces the sample size. We have only 
129 first sales and 122 last sales with available data on day one, after dropping seven last 
sales that occur during or after 2003 (the 2003 accounting changes described in Section 2 
could be responsible for terminations during that period). A further complication is that a 
last sale indicates that managers continue to bet on rising stock prices, so subsequent 
returns may reflect either managers’ positive inside information at the time of the sale, or 
negative news that lead to the program termination. 
We find similar return patterns around put option sales, independent of when in a put 
sale program they occur.
11 For initiations, the size and book-to-market adjusted return for 
                                                 
11 The one exception is that the subsample of 29 firms with only 1 issue quarter (i.e., the same initiation and 
termination quarter) exhibits significantly negative pre-issue abnormal returns, and negative (but 
statistically insignificant) post-issue performance. 
  16the first 50 trading days is 3.45% (t-statistic, 2.26), followed by 1.17% for the subsequent 
50 days (t-statistic, 0.74). For comparison, the corresponding point estimates for all sales 
in Table 4 are 2.73% and 1.93%. This suggests that managers are able to time the follow-
up sales at least as successfully as the initial transactions. The point estimates for last 
sales are again similar: 3.55% for the first 50 days and 1.77% for the subsequent 50 days 
(the t-statistics are 1.88 and 0.79, respectively). This is consistent with the idea that the 
terminations results are driven – at least partly – by the positive post-sale effect 
documented in Table 4. 
4.2  Stock price reaction to earnings announcements after put option sales 
The positive excess returns after put sales raise the question what kind of inside 
information managers have. The prior literature on share repurchases (Grullon and 
Michaely (2004), Lie (2005)) examines whether managers have information about future 
changes in profitability at the announcement of a share repurchase program and finds 
mixed results. If managers use private information about future cash flows when they sell 
put options, then investors should be positively surprised by earnings announcements 
following put option sales. To test this hypothesis we examine abnormal stock price 
reactions around the first, second, and third quarterly earnings announcement after the 
sale. 
Fig. 3 shows the average benchmark adjusted cumulative returns for trading days -40 
to 40 around the first quarterly earnings announcement. Similar to Fig. 2, we use 49 
industry portfolios and 100 size and book-to-market portfolios as benchmarks. 
Interestingly, the cumulative returns are almost zero up to 5 days before the 
announcement and increase sharply during the subsequent 35 trading days. For example, 
the industry-adjusted return is 0.1% on day -6 and reaches 2.75% on day 30. More than 
30% of the 100-day post-sale effect documented in Table 4 occurs during the 10-day 
window around the first quarterly earnings announcement.
12
                                                 
12 Frazzini and Lamont (2006) recently argue that in general there is a positive, volume-related 
average earnings announcement premium. Their estimates are too small (e.g., 30 basis points for 
the 10 days following the earnings announcement) to explain our quarter 1 results, and we find no 
evidence of an average positive return for quarters 2 and 3. 
  17Interestingly, we do not observe a jump in the stock price on the earnings 
announcement date. Instead, the price on average increases steadily for several weeks 
following the announcement. This suggests that managers’ private information is not 
limited to the next quarterly earnings figure. It seems plausible that the quarterly or 
annual filings subsequent to the earnings announcement reveal additional positive 
information. For example, the disclosure of put option sales could itself signal insiders’ 
optimism to the market, causing the post-announcement price run-up. Further, it seems 
unlikely that the post-announcement effect merely reflects slow market reaction to 
earnings news. In the accounting literature, any such post-announcement drift is less 
likely for large firms, and would be evidenced in the stock price response at subsequent 
quarters’ earnings announcements; from Table 5, we find no such effect for quarters 2 
and 3. 
Table 5 shows the average cumulative returns and t-statistics for various windows 
around the first, second, and third earnings announcement after the sale. The bottom 
panel focuses on the 5-day, 11-day, and 21-day windows centered at the announcement. 
Consistent with the results in Fig. 2, the cumulative abnormal returns are positive and 
statistically significant for all three windows around the first announcement. For the 
second announcement, the returns are still positive but – except in one case – not 
statistically significant, and there is no evidence of abnormal returns around the third 
announcement. Thus any mispricing disappears relatively quickly after investors learn the 
most recent earnings results.  
Overall, the return analysis suggests that managers use inside information about 
future profitability to time corporate transactions, and that they do so successfully. 
Although we cannot reject the notion that some managers are overconfident, our results 
show that overconfidence is not the only driver behind managers’ attempts to time 
securities sales.  
4.3  Stock price performance during breaks in the put sale programs 
If managers of firms with an ongoing put sale program use inside information, then 
the positive excess returns should occur only in those quarters subsequent to put issues, 
and should be absent during quarters in which no puts are outstanding. Such a 
  18comparison exploits time-series variation in a firm’s put sale program intensity. The 
comparison also provides a good specification check because an alternative explanation 
for the Table 4 positive excess returns after put sales is that our models for benchmark 
returns systematically misprice put issuers during the sample period. Put selling firms 
tend to be large and profitable growth firms, and it is conceivable that this fairly 
homogeneous group of firms outperformed its market-, industry-, and characteristics-
based benchmarks throughout the relevant time period.  
Fig. 4 shows benchmark adjusted cumulative returns for quarters in which an ongoing 
put option program is interrupted. We define these “break” quarters as periods in which 
no options are issued or outstanding, but which are preceded and followed by put option 
sales. In Fig. 4.A, returns are cumulated starting from the end of the first break quarter 
until the next put sale or until trading day 150. In contrast to the previous findings, there 
is no evidence of positive excess returns for either industry- or size- and book-to-market 
adjusted returns. Fig. 4.B shows the average benchmark adjusted cumulative returns 
around the break quarters’ earnings announcements, and similarly shows no evidence of 
positive abnormal returns. The finding of positive excess returns subsequent to put sales 
in Fig. 2 and 3 and the absence of positive excess returns during break quarters in Fig. 4 
reinforces the conclusion that managers use inside information to time their put sales. 
4.4  Changes in operating performance around put option sales 
Given that the market may be positively surprised by the put sellers’ post-sale 
profitability, we next analyze the issuers’ operating performance before and after the 
sales. We examine both raw and benchmark adjusted performance to better understand 
what type of information investors may be missing when forecasting post-sale earnings. 
Following Lie (2001 and 2005), we use two sets of control firms. We calculate 
industry adjusted performance by selecting control firms that are in the same 2-digit SIC 
industry and are closest to the sample firms in terms of beginning-of-quarter book assets. 
We construct a second set of control firms by selecting firms that are from the same 2-
digit industry, have similar pre-sale operating performance (measured as ROA in the four 
quarters ending in the pre-sale quarter), and similar pre-sale market-to-book ratios 
(measured in the beginning of the sale quarter). The matching procedure is described in 
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predictable mean reversion in accounting earnings. 
Table 6 presents operating performance around the 606 put sale quarters for which 
the matching procedure was successful. There are three interesting findings in the table. 
First, the unadjusted operating performance of the put sellers deteriorates starting before 
the put sale and continuing after the sale. For example, the mean change in operating 
ROA from quarter -1 to quarter 4 (the sale quarter is denoted as quarter zero) is -0.54 
percentage points (t-statistic -2.48), and the mean change from quarter –1 to quarter 8 is -
0.69 percentage points (t-statistic -2.90). Second, the industry adjusted numbers show 
that put sellers strongly outperform their size matched industry peers both before and 
after the put sales. There is some evidence that the outperformance declines after the put 
sale, which may be caused by predictable mean reversion in ROA.  
The final two columns in Table 6 report put issuers’ operating performance relative to 
their industry, performance, and market-to-book matched control firms. The put issuers 
outperform their benchmarks starting in the quarter of the put sale, and the 
outperformance increases over time. For example, the mean change in adjusted ROA 
from quarter -1 to quarter 4 is 1.27 percentage points (t-statistic 3.82), and the mean 
change from quarter -1 to quarter 8 is 1.63 percentage points (t-statistic 4.56). Hence, 
even though ROA declines after put sales, the decline is smaller than that of control firms 
with similar pre-sale performance. This pattern is qualitatively similar to the results found 
by Lie (2005) for the announcements of share repurchase programs, but the 
outperformance after put sales is several times larger than the outperformance after 
repurchase announcements. The results in Table 6, combined with the positive excess 
returns around post-sale earnings announcements in Table 5, suggest that investors may 
have overestimated earnings declines for put issuers, and that firms sold puts to take 
advantage of the resulting undervaluation. 
4.5  Do managers time volatility? 
The value of a put option increases with the volatility of the underlying stock, so it is 
possible that managers sell put options when they expect future volatility to be lower than 
predicted by the market. In this section, we examine volatility changes around the 
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Finding that volatility declines after programs are initiated, stays low or declines further 
after subsequent sales, and finally increases after programs are terminated would be 
consistent with volatility timing. One limitation of this analysis is, however, that we do 
not know investors’ actual volatility forecasts and have to rely on changes in realized 
volatility instead. 
Fig. 5 shows volatility around the firms’ first, last and all other put sales. Volatility on 
a given day is estimated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the prior 50 
trading days. The figure shows that average volatility declines around the time when put 
option programs are initiated: it is 3.1% on day -20, drops to 2.8% on day 20, and stays 
close to this level for the subsequent 180 trading days. Consistent with this pattern, there 
are no significant volatility changes around the intermediate sales: it appears that 
volatility remains low – compared to the pre-initiation level – throughout the duration of 
the programs. Interestingly, volatility increases again around the time of the final sale: it 
is 3.0% on day -20, compared to 3.3% on day 20 after the last sale. This suggests that 
private information about volatility may influence both the initiation and the termination 
decisions. The pattern of volatility shifts in Figure 4 is similar if instead of using mean 
volatility we examine the median (cross-sectional) volatility. This suggest that the results 
are not driven by a small subsample of firms. 
In Table 7 we test whether the volatility changes documented in Fig. 4 are statistically 
significant. Panel A shows average changes in volatility from before to after put option 
sales. We estimate volatility as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over 50, 100, 
or 200 trading days before or after the put sale. We control for changes in market 
volatility in two ways, either by subtracting a benchmark portfolio return from the raw 
returns before computing volatility (Panel A), or by subtracting a benchmark portfolio 
volatility from the volatility of the raw returns (Panel B). We use the same benchmark 
portfolios as in Table 4, and the results are similar across the different specifications. 
Consistent with the results in Fig. 5, we find that, on average, volatility declines after 
initiations and increases after terminations, and that there are no significant volatility 
changes around all other issues. The volatility declines around the initial sales are 
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to -4.26) and are not significant for the 50-day horizon (t-statistics from -1.00 to -1.65). 
Similarly, the volatility increases around the final sales are statistically significant for the 
50-day and the 100-day horizons (t-statistics from 1.88 to 3.15) and are not significant for 
the 200-day horizon (t-statistics from 0.47 to 1.79). Thus it appears that put option 
programs coincide with periods of relatively low volatility, which is consistent with 
market timing. 
5  Conclusions 
The relevance of market timing explanations for corporate behavior continues to be 
an unresolved issue. We provide some of the first evidence that firms issue securities for 
the sole purpose of taking advantage of mispriced equity. Prior literature on market 
timing examines equity issues, equity repurchases, and debt issues, all of which can be 
motivated by reasons other than mispricing. Put sales, on the other hand, have no obvious 
motivation in investment activity or capital structure, and management’s belief that it can 
time the market seems the most plausible rationale.  
We find strong evidence that managers are able to predict future stock returns. Put 
issuers outperform their risk-based benchmarks by 4.66% in the 100 trading days after a 
put sale. Much of the outperformance is realized following the first earnings release date 
after the put sale, suggesting that managers may base their put sale decisions on inside 
information about future profitability. We also find evidence that managers successfully 
time the volatility of their stock returns. Realized volatility declines significantly after the 
first put sale and increases following the last sale. Hence put sale programs seem to 
coincide with periods of unusually low volatility for issuers, as would be expected if they 
have information about future volatility which put purchasers do not. 
Our results provide support for the idea that managers can identify mispriced equity 
and use securities issues to time the market. This is consistent with managers’ self-
professed belief in their ability to market time, but shows that this belief is based on more 
than managerial overconfidence. While our study does not provide direct evidence that 
market timing is a factor behind equity issues and repurchases, the results shift our priors 
  22on the potential importance of timing explanations for a broader set of securities 
transactions than examined here. 
  23Appendix 
We construct the performance-based matching sample in Section 4.4 based on 
methodology in Lie (2001 and 2005). We measure performance as return on assets 
(ROA) defined as operating income in percent of the average of beginning- and end-of-
quarter cash adjusted assets (cash adjusted assets is the book value of assets less cash and 
short-term securities
13). For each put issuer, we identify all Compustat firms in the same 
2-digit SIC industry that have: (1) ROA in the quarter before the put sale (quarter −1) 
within ±20% or within ±1 percentage point of the put issuer; (2) ROA for the four 
quarters ending in quarter −1 within ±20% or within ±1 percentage point of the put 
issuer; and (3) market-to-book ratio in the beginning of the sale quarter within ±20% or 
within ±0.1 of the put issuer. If no firm meets all criteria, we select firms from the same 
1-digit SIC industry, and finally without any industry requirement. If still no suitable 
firms are found, we disregard the performance and market-to-book criteria. Finally, 
among all candidate firms, we select the matching firm with performance characteristics 
closest to the put issuer, where distance is defined as: 
 | ROAQuarter −1, put seller – ROAQuarter −1, matched firm|  
+   |ROAQuarters −5 to −1, put seller – ROA Quarters −5 to −1, matched firm| 
+   |M/BQuarter −1, put seller – M/BQuarter −1, matched firm| 
 
This procedure requires that both put issuers and matching firms have ROA data for 
the four quarters preceding the put sale available. To avoid matching with very small 
firms, we exclude matching firms with book assets less than $10 million. 
                                                 
13 Lie (2005) advocates subtracting cash from book assets since the scaled operating performance of firms 
that repurchase shares may increase solely because cash is removed from the balance sheet to fund 
repurchases. 
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Fig. 1. Number of put sales and put issuing firms by year. There are 137 put issuing firms and 796 put sales 
from 1991-2004. Depending on available data, a put sale represents either an individual transaction or 
several transactions occurring within one reporting period, usually a fiscal quarter. The precise date of the 
put sale is usually not reported, and the figure is based on the last day of the “sale period”, which is usually 
the fiscal quarter during which the sale takes place.  
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Fig. 2. Cumulative abnormal returns around put option sales. The figure shows average benchmark adjusted 
cumulative returns from trading day –100 to 150 after the put sale event (put sale event is defined in Table 
4). There are 137 put selling firms and 651 put sale events from 1991-2004 with available return data on 
day –100. Cumulative return for trading day t is the sum of daily returns from trading day –100 to t. Daily 
abnormal returns are computed by subtracting the daily return on a benchmark portfolio from the 
corresponding stock return. We use two benchmarks: the 49 industry portfolios and the 100 size and book-
to-market portfolios from Ken French’s website (see Fama and French, 1993 and 1997). 
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Fig. 3. Cumulative abnormal returns around the first earnings announcement after a put option sale. The 
figure shows average benchmark adjusted cumulative returns from trading day –40 to 40 after the first 
earnings announcement following a put sale event (put sale event is defined in Table 4). There are 137 put 
selling firms and 631 put sale events from 1991-2004 with available announcement and return data. 
Cumulative return for trading day t is the sum of daily returns from trading day –40 to t. Daily abnormal 
returns are computed by subtracting the daily return on a benchmark portfolio from the corresponding stock 
return. We use two benchmarks: the 49 industry portfolios and the 100 size and book-to-market portfolios 
from Ken French’s website (see Fama and French, 1993 and 1997). 
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Fig. 4. Abnormal returns during breaks in put option programs. The figure shows abnormal returns for 
quarters in which an ongoing put option program is interrupted and subsequently resumed. We define these 
“break” quarters as quarters in which no options are issued or outstanding, but which are preceded and 
followed by put option sales. In Fig. A, returns are cumulated started from the end of the first break quarter 
until the beginning of the next issue period (or up to trading day 150, whichever comes first). There are 107 
quarters (28 firms) with returns available on day one, and 62 quarters with returns available on day 150. 
Fig. B shows cumulative returns around earnings announcements for the 99 break quarters depicted in Fig. 
A for which earnings announcement dates are available. Returns are cumulated from day -40 through day 
40 after the earnings announcement.  
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Fig. 5. Stock return volatility around put option sales. The figure shows average stock return volatility 
estimated for rolling windows around the put sale event (put sale event is defined in Table 4). Volatility on 
trading day t is the standard deviation of daily stock returns from t-50 to t. We require that returns are 
available for 50 trading days for each estimate. The figure shows estimates for windows ending on day –
100 to 200 after the put sale event. The mean volatility is computed separately for the firms’ first, last, and 
all other put option sales. There are 129 first sales, 124 last sales, and 426 all other sales with available 
volatility estimates for day 0. 
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics for put issuers, repurchasing firms, and all Compustat firms during 1991-2004. The samples consist of 137 put issuers (355 firm-years), 
5,523 repurchasing firms (13,087 firm-years), and 14,263 Compustat firms (99,546 firm-years). A firm-year is included in the put issuer sample if the firm has at 
least one put option sale in the fiscal year. A firm-year is included in the repurchasing firm sample if the firm repurchases shares worth at least 0.5% of the prior-
quarter book assets in at least one quarter of the fiscal year. ASSETS and SALES are book assets and sales ($billions). B/M is the ratio of the book value to the 
market value of common stock. R&D, PPE, and CASH are R&D expense, PP&E plus inventory, and cash plus short-term investments scaled by book assets. 
R&D and PPE are set to zero if they are missing on Compustat. ROA is net income scaled by the prior-year book assets. Dividend is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the firm pays a dividend. Leverage equals total debt divided by the sum of total debt and the book value of common stock. Net stock sale is the difference 
between the sale and the purchase of common and preferred stock scaled by the prior-year market value of common stock. Some variables are not available for 
the full samples. All variables are winsorized at the 1
st and the 99
th percentile in the Compustat sample. 
 
  Put issuers    Repurchasing firms    All Compustat firms 
  Mean  Median Std    Mean  Median Std    Mean  Median Std 
Assets  10.01 2.58  15.61  2.31 0.26 7.00  2.32 0.18 8.01 
Sales  6.06 2.11 7.83  1.83 0.25 4.49  1.19 0.10 3.70 
B/M  0.38 0.31 0.30  0.62 0.47 0.54  0.72 0.56 0.65 
R&D  0.05 0.02 0.06  0.04 0.00 0.08  0.04 0.00 0.10 
PPE  0.40 0.39 0.25  0.37 0.36 0.25  0.36 0.34 0.28 
Cash  0.16 0.09 0.18  0.18 0.10 0.21  0.17 0.07 0.22 
ROA  0.09 0.07 0.11  0.03 0.06 0.20  -0.04 0.02 0.25 
Dividend  0.61 1.00 0.49  0.47 0.00 0.50  0.39 0.00 0.49 
Leverage  0.33 0.33 0.26  0.25 0.20 0.24  0.32 0.29 0.27 
Net stock sale  -0.03  -0.02 0.04  -0.01  -0.02 0.11  0.04 0.00 0.14 
 Table 2  
Industry composition of the put issuer sample. The table lists all two-digit SIC industry groups containing 
at least one put issuer during the sample period of 1991-2004. It shows the number of put issuers and the 
percentage of the put issuer sample in each industry group. For comparison, the table also shows the 
percentage of all Compustat firms in each industry during the sample period. 
 
Industry  SIC  # put issuers
%  of put  
issuer  
sample 
% of all  
Compustat 
firms 
Tobacco Products  21  1  0.73  0.12 
Rubber & Misc Plastics Prods  30  1  0.73  0.94 
Misc Manufacturing Industries  39  1  0.73  0.97 
Railroad Transportation  40  1  0.73  0.17 
Transportation By Air  45  1  0.73  0.47 
Electric, Gas, Sanitary Service  49  1  0.73  2.36 
Nondurable Goods-Wholesale  51  1  0.73  1.41 
Food Stores  54  1  0.73  0.44 
Home Furniture & Equip Store  57  1  0.73  0.37 
Nondepository Credit Instn  61  1  0.73  1.24 
Engr,ACC,Resh,Mgmt,Rel Svcs  87  1  0.73  2.16 
Food and Kindred Products  20  2  1.46  1.53 
Apparel & Other Finished Pds  23  2  1.46  0.74 
Paper and Allied Products  26  2  1.46  0.74 
Pete Refining & Related Inds  29  2  1.46  0.43 
Fabr Metal, Ex Machy, Trans Eq  34  2  1.46  1.18 
Transportation Equipment  37  2  1.46  1.55 
General Merchandise Stores  53  2  1.46  0.46 
Apparel and Accessory Stores  56  2  1.46  0.50 
Holding, Other Invest Offices  67  2  1.46  3.57 
Amusements, Recreation  79  3  2.19  0.97 
Printing, Publishing & Allied  27  4  2.92  1.09 
Eating and Drinking Places  58  4  2.92  1.22 
Security & Commodity Brokers  62  4  2.92  0.93 
Health Services  80  5  3.65  1.89 
Meas Instr;Photo Gds;Watches  38  6  4.38  5.12 
Communications 48  6  4.38  3.43 
Oil and Gas Extraction  13  7  5.11  2.74 
Insurance Carriers  63  7  5.11  2.33 
Business Services  73  13  9.49  11.28 
Chemicals & Allied Products  28  15  10.95  5.48 
Indl, Comml Machy, Computer  35  16  11.68  5.31 
Electr, Oth Elec Eq, Ex Cmp  36  18  13.14  5.82 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics for put option sales and programs. The total number of firms with put sales programs is 
137, and the total number of put sales is 796. We exclude 32 maturity extensions of previously sold puts 
from the sample. The number of observations is reduced further because of missing data. The face value of 
a put issue is the number of puts sold times the average strike price. The moneyness of a put issue is the 
ratio of the average strike price to the issuer’s stock price on the put sale date, or averaged over the sale 
period (usually the fiscal quarter of the sale). The maturity of a put issue is the number of days between the 
put sale date (or the midpoint of the sale period) and the maturity date (or the midpoint of the maturity 
period). The fraction of all put issues exercised or settled is reported only for issues that can be traced from 
sale to maturity and for which the final outcome is reported by the issuer. 
 
Panel A: Individual put sales, n=796                      
   Mean     10th Pctile  Median  90th Pctile      Obs. 
             
Number of puts sold (mil. of shares)  4.9   0.10  0.8  8.0    657 
… scaled by number of shares outstanding  0.88%   0.08%  0.40%  2.05%   657 
             
Face value ($ mil.)  67.6   2.70  18.0  131.0    461 
… scaled by equity market capitalization  0.83%   0.07%  0.42%  1.61%   461 
             
Proceeds ($ mil.)  10.5   0.25  2.1  20.0    475 
… scaled by equity market capitalization  0.09%   0.01%  0.04%  0.22%   475 
             
Moneyness (strike price / stock price)  95%   81%  96%  108%   567 
             
Maturity (days)  211   81  182  367    574 
             
Fraction of put sales that are exercised or settled  36%      - - -      447 
              
Panel B: Put sale programs, n=137                      
   Mean     10th Pctile  Median  90th Pctile      Obs. 
              
Number of put sales  5.8    1 4  13   137 
              
Number of puts sold (mil. of shares)  21.0   0.40  2.6  25.2    108 
… scaled by number of shares outstanding  4.15%   0.52%  1.84%  9.37%   108 
             
Face value ($ mil.)  223.4   5.20  43.7  286.0    68 
… scaled by equity market capitalization  3.47%   0.56%  1.84%  7.99%    68 
             
Proceeds from put sales ($ mil.)  53.4   0.43  5.8  85.1   84 
… scaled by equity market capitalization  0.42%   0.03%  0.14%  1.18%    84 
              
Program length (years)              
… from the first to the last put sale  2.1   0.08  1.3  5.3    137 
… from the first put sale to the last exercise or 
expiration  2.8   0.59  2.0  6.3    137 
              
Number of quarters with a put sale  5.4     1  4  11     137 36
Table 4  
Abnormal returns around put option sales. The table shows average abnormal cumulative returns and t statistics for various windows around the put sale event. 
The precise date of the put sale is usually not reported, and we define an event as the last day of the “sale period”, which is usually the fiscal quarter during which 
the sale takes place. If multiple sales occur during one sale period, we treat these sales as one event. There are 137 put selling firms and 664 put sale events from 
1991-2004 with available return data on the event day. Cumulative returns are computed for six 50-day intervals: from trading day –100 to –50, from trading day 
–50 to 0, etc. If a given interval (e.g. –50 to 0) overlaps for different events of the same firm, we keep only the earlier event. Cumulative return is the sum of 
daily returns during the 50-day interval. Daily abnormal returns are computed by subtracting the daily return on a benchmark portfolio from the corresponding 
stock return. We use three benchmarks: the value-weighted CRSP index, the 49 industry portfolios and the 100 size and book-to-market portfolios from Ken 
French’s website (see Fama and French, 1993 and 1997). 
 
Mean returns    T-statistics      Trading days 
after event  Raw returns  Market adj.  Size/BM adj.  Industry adj.    Raw returns  Market adj.  Size/BM adj.  Industry adj.    N 
-100 to –50  2.01  -0.07  -0.22  -0.22  2.44  -0.09 -0.29  -0.30    601 
-50  to  0  0.58 -1.15  -1.02  -0.34  0.65 -1.48  -1.37  -0.48    605 
0 to 50  4.91  3.04  2.78  2.47  5.72 3.98  3.74  3.66    603 
50 to 100  4.68  2.26  1.88  1.88  5.60 2.89  2.44  2.61    602 
100 to 150  3.57  1.71  1.32  1.04  4.23 2.20  1.68 1.42    596 
150 to 200  2.01  0.48  0.34  0.59    2.38  0.62 0.44  0.83    593 
 Table 5  
Cumulative returns around earnings announcements following put option sales. The table shows average 
cumulative returns and t-statistics around the first three earnings announcements (EA) following a put sale 
event (put sale event is defined in Table 4). The sample consists of 137 put selling firms and 631 earnings 
announcements from 1991-2004. Panel A shows cumulative returns from trading day –5 to 40 after the first 
announcement; Panel B shows cumulative returns for shorter windows centered around the first, second, 
and third announcement. In Panel B, the sample of 338 second announcements does not include 
announcements numbered second and first for subsequent events of the same firm. Similarly, the sample of 
242 third announcements does not include announcements numbered third as well as second and/or first. 
Cumulative return is the sum of daily returns during the even window. Daily abnormal returns are 
computed by subtracting the daily return on a benchmark portfolio from the corresponding stock return (the 
benchmarks are described in Table 4). 
 
 Mean  cumulative  returns  T-statistics     
EA# 
after 
event 
Trading 
days 
Market 
adj. 
Size/BM
adj. 
Industry
adj. 
Market 
adj. 
Size/BM
adj. 
Industry 
adj.   N 
Panel A: Cumulative returns from trading day –5 after earning announcement 
1  -5  0.10  0.05 0.10  0.74  0.42 0.83    631 
 -4  0.35  0.26  0.24  2.08  1.60 1.61    631 
 -3  0.47  0.35  0.36  2.43 1.85  2.00   631 
 -2  0.72  0.61  0.53  3.36 2.87  2.69   631 
 -1  0.99  0.88  0.74  4.12 3.73  3.45   631 
 0  1.16  1.02  0.83 3.98 3.58  3.21   631 
 1  1.40  1.22  1.02 4.11 3.70  3.43   631 
 2  1.50  1.31  1.04 4.27 3.87  3.37   631 
 3  1.64  1.44  1.17 4.56 4.16  3.64   631 
 4  1.72  1.46  1.24 4.47 3.93  3.61   631 
 5  1.94  1.66  1.44 4.79 4.24  4.04   631 
 10 2.17  1.87  1.64  4.69 4.19  4.10   631 
 20 3.10  2.72  2.20  5.78 5.22  4.61   631 
 30 3.42  2.93  2.68  5.34 4.78  4.73   630 
 40 3.36  2.84  2.96  4.69 4.17  4.69   629 
Panel B: Cumulative returns for the interval in Col. 2 around earnings announcement 
1 -2,  2  1.03  0.96  0.67  3.20 3.06  2.41   631 
 -5,  5  1.94  1.66  1.44  4.79 4.24  4.04   631 
 -10,  10  2.15  1.84  1.69  4.26 3.73  3.74   631 
                
2  -2,  2 0.42  0.54 0.23  1.00  1.31 0.59    338 
  -5,  5 0.92  0.92 0.44  1.65  1.64 0.85    338 
  -10,  10  1.13  1.28 0.52  1.62  1.82 0.83    338 
                
3  -2,  2 -0.28  -0.35 -0.72  -0.48  -0.62 -1.35    242 
  -5,  5  0.14 0.10 -0.40  0.21 0.14 -0.63    242 
  -10,  10 0.89 0.60 -0.04  1.01 0.68 -0.06    242 
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Quarterly operating performance around put sales. Operating performance is measured as operating income 
scaled by average cash-adjusted assets. The put sale occurs in quarter 0. Industry-adjusted performance is 
the performance of put issuers less the performance of industry- and size- matched control firms. 
Performance-adjusted performance is the performance of put issuers less the performance of industry-, 
performance-, and market-to-book-matched control firms. The matching procedure is described in Section 
4.4 and in the Appendix. T-statistics for means and Z-statistics from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for 
medians are reported in brackets. 
 
Unadjusted   Industry-adjusted    Performance-adjusted  Quarter N 
Mean  Median     Mean  Median     Mean  Median 
                 
Panel A: Levels of operating performance 
7.92  5.77   3.27  1.60   0.46  0.15  −4 606 
(27.56)  (20.93)   (10.25)  (9.76)   (2.96)  (2.77) 
7.83  5.78   3.12  1.48   0.35  0.03  −3 606 
(27.83)  (21.02)   (10.00)  (9.76)   (2.55)  (1.54) 
7.88  5.73   3.47  1.61   0.19 -0.06  −2 606 
(28.41)  (21.24)   (11.04)  (10.36)   (1.27)  (0.34) 
7.73  5.63   3.39  1.48   0.21  -0.01  −1 606 
(27.14)  (20.96)   (10.62)  (9.92)   (2.48)  (0.68) 
7.72  5.67   3.55  1.57   0.38  0.21  0 597 
(27.07)  (20.92)   (10.98)  (10.11)   (1.84)  (2.58) 
7.56  5.35   3.41  1.25   0.71  0.06  +1 588 
(26.51)  (20.78)   (10.53)  (9.40)   (3.25)  (2.19) 
7.51  5.32   3.35  1.31   0.79  0.22  +2 576 
(24.46)  (20.21)   (9.95)  (9.04)   (2.75)  (2.56) 
7.40  5.19   3.21  1.33   1.07  0.15  +3 566 
(23.59)  (19.79)   (9.04)  (8.32)   (3.34)  (3.14) 
7.43  5.23   3.37  1.46   1.46  0.28  +4 559 
(23.48)  (19.91)   (9.16)  (8.78)   (4.42)  (3.34) 
7.32  5.20   3.01  1.44   1.38  0.12  +5 552 
(23.54)  (19.55)   (8.30)  (8.06)   (4.18)  (2.63) 
7.40  5.37   3.21  1.47   1.49  0.10  +6 547 
(24.25)  (19.80)   (9.17)  (8.58)   (4.71)  (2.77) 
7.42  5.25   3.11  1.42   1.72  0.45  +7 544 
(24.03)  (19.88)   (8.66)  (8.27)   (5.49)  (3.77) 
7.27  5.11   3.07  1.34   1.88  0.33  +8 540 
(23.56)  (19.38)   (8.14)  (8.00)   (5.18)  (3.83) 
                 
Panel B: Changes in operating performance 
-0.03  -0.01   0.14  0.02   0.17  0.16  −1 to 0  597 
(-0.30)  (-0.66)   (0.92)  (0.91)   (0.88)  (1.66) 
-0.16  -0.08   0.07  -0.06   0.50  0.06  −1 to +1  588 
(-1.14)  (-1.40)   (0.40)  (0.04)   (2.34)  (1.61) 
-0.31  -0.17   0.06 -0.07   0.63  0.18  −1 to +2  576 
(-1.69)  (-2.49)   (0.28)  (-0.27)   (2.22)  (2.08) 
-0.54 -0.32   -0.08 -0.20   1.27  0.07  −1 to +4  559 
(-2.48)  (-3.96)   (-0.31)  (-1.26)   (3.82)  (2.54) 
-0.69 -0.66   -0.34  -0.34   1.63  0.33  −1 to +8  540 
(-2.90)  (-4.56)     (-1.07)  (-2.15)     (4.56)  (3.31) 
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Changes in stock return volatility from before to after put option sales. The table shows the average change 
in volatility from before to after a put sale event (put sale event is defined in Table 4) and the 
corresponding t-statistics. All statistics are shown separately for the firms’ first, last, and all other put sale 
events. In Panel A, volatility is the daily standard deviation of benchmark adjusted stock returns; in Panel 
B, volatility is the daily standard deviation of raw returns minus the daily standard deviation of a 
benchmark portfolio return computed over the same period. We use three benchmarks: the value-weighted 
CRSP index, the 49 industry portfolios and the 100 size and book-to-market portfolios from Ken French’s 
website. Volatility is computed over 50, 100, or 200 trading days before and after the event, and we require 
that returns are available for at least 50 trading days for each estimate. For “all other” sales, if a given 
horizon (e.g. 50-day after sale) overlaps for different sales of the same firm, we drop the overlapping days 
before computing volatility. More precisely, for each volatility estimate after (before) the sale, we drop 
days that overlap with the same-length horizon for the subsequent (previous) sale. There are 129 first sales, 
122 last sales, and 361 all other sales with available estimates of volatility changes. 
 
Event  Tr. 
days  Changes in volatility before to after    T-statistics for changes 
  
Raw 
returns 
Market
adj. 
Size 
B/M 
adj. 
Indust.
adj.  Raw 
Market 
adj. 
Size 
B/M 
adj. 
Indust.
adj. 
Panel A: Volatility = daily std of benchmark adjusted returns (%) 
First  sale  50  -0.15 -0.11 -0.09  -0.09  -1.42 -1.12 -1.00  -0.96 
  100  -0.20 -0.17 -0.15  -0.18  -2.36 -2.10 -1.99  -2.31 
  200  -0.19 -0.17 -0.15  -0.16  -2.56 -2.31 -2.19  -2.43 
               
All  other  50  0.10 0.08 0.09  0.07  1.96 1.62 1.80  1.55 
  100  0.05 0.03 0.05  0.04  1.02 0.74 0.99  0.86 
  200  0.06 0.05 0.06  0.05  1.35 1.04 1.27  1.11 
               
Last  sale  50  0.24 0.21 0.23  0.19  2.34 2.24 2.53  2.12 
  100  0.32 0.30 0.30  0.26  3.11 3.15 3.05  2.75 
  200  0.17 0.13 0.12  0.12  1.79 1.42 1.28  1.25 
Panel B: Volatility = daily std of raw returns minus daily std of benchmark portfolio returns (%) 
First  sale  50  -0.15 -0.17 -0.13  -0.14  -1.42 -1.65 -1.34  -1.49 
  100  -0.20 -0.23 -0.22  -0.26  -2.36 -2.96 -2.79  -3.45 
  200  -0.19 -0.27 -0.25  -0.31  -2.56 -3.89 -3.45  -4.26 
               
All  other  50  0.10 0.03 0.03  -0.02  1.96 0.70 0.67  -0.35 
  100  0.05 0.01 0.01  -0.03  1.02 0.24 0.22  -0.63 
  200  0.06 0.02 0.02  -0.01  1.35 0.40 0.50  -0.31 
               
Last  sale  50  0.24 0.18 0.21  0.15  2.34  1.88  2.28  1.61 
  100  0.32 0.27 0.26  0.21  3.11 2.94 2.82  2.38 
  200  0.17 0.08 0.07  0.04  1.79 0.92 0.81  0.47 
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